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To determine the function or confirmation and discon-
:firmation of expectancy during modeling behavior, 60 primary 
school children were exposed to a training film (adult male 
model), and then to three conditions or expectancy confirma-
tion (group C, l~; group CNe, 50%; group NC, 0%) through a 
second experimental £ilm. Sst responses were observed under 
incentive and no-incentive conditions. Though expectancy was 
not significant, incentive was (p < ~Ol). S responses which 
matched M's responses in the film showed that cOnXirmation ox 
expectancy did not a£fect imitative l.earning. While the 
perceptual definition of expectancy in this study had no 
e£fect, expectancy as a motivational condition and measured 
during actual observational l.earning (training rilm) was 
discussed as having an effect on number o£ matching responses 
in modeling. 
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Introduction ~~ Problem 
The innovative modeling/vicarious learning experiments 
ox Albert Bandura (1962, 1965b, 1969) are distinct among 
contemporary psychological research :for their support of a 
stimulus-contiguity theory of observational learning. 
Whereas reinforcement theory (Miller and Dollard, 1941) and 
sensory feedback theory (Mowrer, 1960) have been put :forth 
to explain what is variously called imitation or social 
learning, these theories have not been as extensively 
researched in their application to modeling as has Bandura' s 
theory. 
Modeling is the observational learning o£ matching 
responses when the observer does not perform the model's 
responses during the process of acquisition and no rein£orce~ 
ment is given to the model or the observer (Bandura, 1968)0 
In an experiment in which children observed a film-mediated 
model exhibit a sequence of physical and verbal aggressive 
responses, Bandura (l965a) has shown that the acquisition of 
matching responses by the observer results primarily from 
stimUlus contiguity and associated symbolic processes. In 
1 
2 
one treatment condition the model was severely punished 
Iollowing the display or aggressive behavior; in a second the 
model was rewarded with treats and praise; and in the third 
the model's responses had no consequences. A performance 
test after the film revealed that the reinforcement contin-
gencies applied to the model's responses resulted in 
differential degrees of matching behavior. Those in the 
model-rewarded and Do~onsequ.ences groups performed a signifi-
cantly greater variety of matching responses than those in 
the model-punished group. Following the performance test, 
incentive conditions were introduced to all three 9roups for 
a second performance. Matching responses in all groups 
increased and the performance differences of the first test 
were eliminated, revealing equal amounts of learning in the 
model.-punished, model-rewarded, and no~consequences groups. 
Phillips (1968) supports Bandura in his finding that a 
subject who merely observes a nonreinrorced model displays a 
significant increase in critical responses. In a replication 
of two verbal conditioning experiments in which Ss said words 
in turn with a tape-recorded voice, Phillips added a control 
group, which, unlike the experimental groups (one 30J5 
vicarious reinforcement, one 601£ vicarious reinforcement), 
did not hear the direct verbal reinrorcement ox E nor the 
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vicarious reinforcement on tape. The conclusion was that the 
apparent learning due to vicarious reinIorcement was in fact 
solely the result of imitation of the model. Thus, reinforce-
ment consequences to the model or to the observer influence 
only the performance ox responses, not the learning of 
responses. 
Another study (Bandura and McDonald, 1963) tested the 
effects or modeling v. reini'orcement in altering children's 
moral judgment responses. Children exhibiting subjective 
judgments were either (a) exposed to models who expressed 
objective judgments or (b) reinrorced for objective judgments. 
Judgmental responses were more effectively altered by the 
model-exposed group than the merely-reinrorced group. 
From a Guthrian-contiguity point of view, reinforcement 
may be said to preserve an S-R sequence, that is, prevent 
unlearning. If this is the case, how is the observed S-R 
response sequence of the model preserved in the observer wdth-
out reinforcement, as Bandura maintains? 8andura (1965a, 
P. 590) theorizes that: 
when an Observer witnesses a model exhibit a sequence 
of responses the observer acquires, through contiguous 
association or sensory events, perceptual and symbolic 
responses possessing cue properties that are capable 
of eliciting, at some time after a demonstration, 
overt responses corresponding to those that have been 
modeled. 
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Bandura's research on this mediational/contiguity theory, 
even when considering attentional and motivational processes, 
has not provided, prior to observer per£ormance t a measurable 
terminating point at which the experimenter can say learning 
has taken place. 
Perhaps it is not what comes after the response that is 
crucial (as in reinforcement theory), but what comes before. 
This which "comes before" is proposed to· be a m.ediational-
cognitive process of expectation t which occurs in a modeling 
situation before the observer makes ~y overt responses. As 
a cogni tive process, expectation has an on-.going nature, 
which is its quality of preserving an S-R sequence. At the 
same time, as a mediational process , it has an overt 
measurable nature in the verbal reports of the observer 
(experimental subject). 
Review .2!. Literature 
Because of its cognitive nature, Bandura's theory is 
not necessarily antagonistic to an expectancy construct. A 
large block o£ Bandura's work is concerned with the thera-
peutic use of modeling in modi£ying anxiety disorders. The 
first study in' a series on what Bandura terms "vicarious 
extinction f ' dealt wi th reducing dog avoidance behavior in 
children (Bandura, Grusec, and Menlove, 1967). The £our 
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treatment conditions were: model in positive context; model 
in neutral context; dog in positive context; and positive 
context only. The' children in the model groups observed a 
peer model exhibit progressively more fear-provoking behavior 
with the dog from session to session. The post-test measure 
or dog-avoidance behavior (after completion of the treatment 
and again a month later) revealed that the two model groups 
showed significantly greater approach behavior both toward 
the experimental and an unfamiliar animal (modeling effects 
had generalized) than did children in the dog and control 
groups. 
In later experiments, Bandu.ra tested the ef'f'ects o£ 
single model v. multiple models (Bandera and Manlove, 1968) 
and :found little dif£erencej compared live modeling with 
participation to symbolic modeling and to desensitization 
(Bandura, 1969) and found live modeling most e£fective, and 
symbolic modeling m.ore ef':fective than desensitization; and 
compared symbolic modeling wi th relaxation to symbolic 
modeling without relaxation (Bandura, 1969) and :found little 
difference. 
This research is relevant for its support of a cognitive 
theory of learning, that is, one involving "symbolic coding 
and central organization of modeling stimuli, their 
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representation in memory, in verbal and imaginal codes, and 
their subsequent transformation f'rom symbolic forms to motor 
equivalents" (Bandura, 1969, p~ 127). It seems feasible to 
theorize that the basis for either f'orming symbols or 
transforming these symbols (verbal and imaginal) into 
performance is expectancy. Bandu~ra says If _ •• selection 
and performance or matching responses is mainly governed by 
anticipated outcomes based on previous consequences that were 
directly encountered, vicariously experienced, or self-
administered" (1969, po 132)0 
Expectancy may be a motivational construct tied to 
modeling stimuli. As such, it is not easy to test its effect, 
unless its confirmation or disconfirmation during the obser-
vational process of modeling can be shown to affect subsequent 
performance under incentive (learning measure)~ 
Expectation as part of cognitive theory has been 
non-aligned with most S-R learning theories. It is appro-
priate to consider the relationship of this cognitive concept 
to the learning concept of modeling. A primary connection 
theoretically between expectation and modeling is the 
dependence of both on sequential and/or meaningful sensory 
feedbacko Feedback is a necessary but not adequate element 
of observational learning. Depending upon what his expec-
tations are, an observer in a modeling situation must be 
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continually recomposing what Bandura (1969) terms his 
tlimagina1/verbal representational system. u Such cognitive 
symbolization iacili tates modeling or f:fvicarious learningtf 
as Bandura (196Sb) has shown in a study in which children 
observe a film-mediated model exhibit a sequence of novel 
responses under three conditions: Iacilitative symbolization 
(5s verbalized the modeling stimuli); passive observation 
(55 simply observed the film); or competing symbolization 
(5s counted rapidly while observing the film). Incentive/set 
children were told that Iollowing' the movie they would be 
asked to reproduce the model's responses and given candy if 
correct; no-incentive/set children were just told they would 
return to their school room. All 55 counted out loud between 
the end of the movie and reproduction so their activity would 
be held constant. All 5s were offered candy reinIorcement 
and social rewards for matching responses correctly performed. 
The results showed that the facilitative group performed 
significantly more matching responses than the passive and the 
passive more than the competing group. Incentive set had no 
influence on observational learning. Verbal sywbolization 
thus seems to have a "stamping in" effect. 
Representational mediators acquired in modeling through 
contigui ty learning are based on continual feedback, hence, 
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are sequentially associated. The very r'contiguoQsness, n or 
patterning of an 5-R sequence con:firms an expectation, since 
the logicalness, the going-to-fruition o:f expectation is not 
novel to the observer but is part o:f his behavioral, albeit 
cognitive repertoire ox responseso The model's response is 
the cue that the observed situation is over (in the cognitive 
world or any individu.al subject). This response is the cU.e 
:for conxirmation or discanfixmatioD of what the observer was 
expecting. The covert, self-reinforcing quali1:y of expec-
tancy confirmation or disconxirmation through sensory feed-
back preserves the S-R sequence. With the expectancy 
confirmed or disconfirmed, that is, now that the individual 
as an observer is cognitively out of the situation, he does 
not need overt or even vicarious reinforcement (to the model) 
in order to learn, though, as Bandura (1969) revealed, he 
may need incentive to increase his per:formance of the model's 
responses (i.e., to show the tllearningff that has taken 
place) • 
According to this theory, i n a proposed experimental 
groupiRg in which expectancies are confirmed (C), or not 
confirmed (NC), there would be no difference between groups 
since both confirmation and disconfirmation serve to take the 
individual out of the S,.R situation and prevent unlearning. 
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The introduction into this design of a third group in which 
expectancies are alternately confirmed and not confirmed (CNC) 
adds a dimension similar to McDavid's (1964) paradigm of 
typical processes outside the laboratory. This third 
expectancy condition may serve to distinguish interaction 
between confirmation and disconfirmation. 
The issue revolves around whether or not there is a 
behavioral difference between a confirmed and disconfirmed 
expectancy, that is, in terms of a learning eff'ect. Let us 
take the Case for confirmed expectancy first. Suppose an 
observer watches a model in a film make responses, and at 
various times in the fila aakes six predictions based on what 
he is expecting the model to do next. One may question: does 
the observer have six different expectations or an overall 
expectation (film length)? 
According to the orderliness/logicalness principle of 
stimulus sequence stated earlier, one might be tempted to 
predict that those in group C, in which expectancies are 
always confirmed, that is, the orderly thing happens, will 
show more matching responses than those in group Ne, in which 
expectations are always disconfirmed, that is, the disorderly, 
illogical thing happens. Or, con£irmation of expectancy, 
like verbal symbolization, may have a facilitory, "stamping 
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inn effect on the learning of observed responses, whereas, 
disconfirmation may have a competing effect. 
However, one might more readily predict that the NC 
group will perform more matching responses than the C groupo 
Crandall (1967) reported that ratings of stimuli with high 
confirmation value never differed significantly from ratings 
of unfamiliar stimuli. His theory that expectancy enhances 
stimulus preference seems to be in accord with Singer's 
(1968) consistency theory that an individual seeks consis-
tency on the basis of selective stimulus processing, or 
scbemata that help the person to screen and hypothesize about 
a stimulus array. The crucial point o£ Crandall's research 
for the confirmation v. disconfirmation issue is his £inding 
that arousal (predictive) stimuli were preferred over 
confirmation stimuli. Conrirmation seems to end an S-R 
sequence less fixedly than disconfirmation because the person 
whose expectation is discon£irmed has more adjustment to 
make. Considering this gxeater adjustment, activation theory 
would also predict a higher probability of matching responses 
in the high dissonance or NC group (Peak, 1968). 
This expectancy disconIirmation, or cognitive dissonance 
as Festinger (1957) has termed it, may also have stronger 
motivational properties than the confirmation condition. 
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Cognitive dissonance has been described by Aronson (1968, 
p. 5) as a Unegative drive state which occurs whenever an 
individual simul taneou.sly holds two cogni tions (ideas, 
beliefs, opinions) which are psychologically inconsistent." 
Disconfirmation of expectancy does not seem to raIl into 
the modeling/variable categories of model attributes, stimuli 
characteristics, or subject characteristics, but rather into 
the category OI motivation, and thus may operate to: (a) in-
crease desire to perform the model's responses, that is lfgo 
along withU the unexpected responsej or (b) alter the 
perceptual threshhold, so that the observed act is ''put out 
of mind,n since it is inconsistent with the held expectation. 
Whereas dissonance seems to have a negative eirect, a 
discOllfirmation ox expectancy can be conceived of as a 
negative stimulus. Senf and Miller (1967), in applying the 
Pavlovian principle of positive induction to discriminatory 
learning, theorize that a negative stimulus (~S) has an 
inductive effect of strengthening the excitability of :focus 
of a positive stimulus (+S) on the cortex. It is harder to 
extinguish a response to a +S by nonrein.forced trials if the 
presentation of +S is alternated with -5 than if there is 
only a succession of +S. The ~S has an excitatory effect, 
increasing resistance to extinction of nonreinforced +S, 
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rather than an inhibitory effect, as the Hull~Spence 
theorist would say. 
This principle of positive induction relates to expec-
tancy and the measure of it (by stopping a film and asking 
expectations) in this way: the presence of a -5 (expectation 
discon£irmed) alternately with nonrein:forced +S (expectation 
confirmed) may increase the learning of the +5 0 The absence 
of -5 with only a succession of +S would theoretically have 
less "focusing, 11 hence, less learning facili tation. On this 
basis, one can hypothesize that an experimental group in which 
expectancy is alternately con£irmed and disconfirmed (CNC) 
would produce a higher number of matching responses than a 
group in which al l expectations would be confirmed (C). 
MCDavid (1964), however, gives little credence to this 
hypothesis in his study on ambiguity of cues in learning 
color discrimination. In this imitation experiment, the 
conditions or training affected levels or performance signi-
ficantly. Under the condition ox lOOJb consistency in color/ 
cue association, there was the most imitation. The condition 
of 67% partial-hut-incomplete association produced the least 
imitation, less than the 33% random association. Considering 
the l~ condition as analogous to the C group (+S) and the 
67% condition as analogous to the NC group (-5), this study 
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supports the hypothesis that C would have signifcantly more 
matching responses than NC. 
The problem ox the role of expectancy in modeling 
behavior should deal with expectancy as a m.ediational con-
struct in a way di:ff'erent from Bandu,ra' s concept of sti:m.ulus 
contiguity. That is, expectancy will be thought or as the 
cognitive process between the antecedent conditions of the 
model's behavior in the film prior to the point at which the 
experimenter asks the subject his expectation ~ the 
no-consequence condi~ion or the model's responses. 
Assuming expectancy to be a mediator, Bandura would 
probably ask: Does expectancy have to do with response 
acquisition or response selection? or, does expectancy have 
to do with learning itself or only with performance and infor-
mation processi.ng? According to Bandura ' s experimental" design 
in the model-consequences study (1965a), if expectancy is a 
factor in observational learning, then any group dif:ferences 
(confirmation v. discomrirmation) in the first trial will not 
be wiped out by incentive in a second trial. This experiment 
was set up to test only the conditions of expectancy. A no-
difference result between groups would not confirm expectancy's 
function in stimulus/contiguity learning. It may be that 
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expectancy will only affect acceptance of information 
(Flanders, 1968). 
Indeed, one may not be able practically to separate 
expectancy and stimulus/contiguity £or differences of effect 
on learning, although Reynolds (1967) in a paired-associate 
learning experiment found that contigu.ous presentation of 
items is as effective as conrirmation of anticipation. The 
anticipation items consisted of a stimulus followed by an S-R 
pair as confirmation (S--~-S-R). The contiguity items were 
simply the S-R pair followed by a pause. Reynold's separation 
of anticipation (expectation) and contiguity may onJy be an 
operational one and only for a simp1e association task, but 
its simple, perceptual basis is not incongruent with Bandura's 
theory (see page 3). 
Statement £! HYpotheses 
There is theory and evidence to sbow that disconfirma-
tiOD of expectancy will produce more learning through greater 
motivational effects which increase the desire to perform the 
model's responses; through exfects of contrast and positive 
induction; or through erfects of arousal. 
There is also theory and evidence to show that confirma-
tion of expectancy will produce more learning through a 
-£ acili ta tory, I! stamping in" effect; through self -rein£orcing 
15 
sensory feedback; through motivational effects altering 
threshold perception; and through promotion of response 
extinction. In discussing Tolman's principle of confirmation, 
Hilgard and Bower (1966) point out that if an expectancy is 
not confirmed, its probability value is decreased, that is, 
it undergoes extinction. If this is true, then the NC group 
should be less likely to produce those responses predicted but 
not confirmed, or, in other words, group C shou,ld match more 
responses of the film model than NC. There is also evidence 
to the contrary, such as Lester's study (l967) which indicated 
that the disconfirmation of expectancy has no significant 
effect on resistance to extinction for children whose task was 
to guess whether or not candy was in a box_ Instead, the 
child was in.fluenced by his own expectation of reward rather 
than rewards received or number of discon£irmations. In 
other words, resistance to extinction of a response (a certain 
guess) was greater if based on expected rather than actual 
reward pattern (such as N, N, R). 
In view ox the lack of research directly relating to 
expectancy/modeling, it is feasible to make several hypo-
theses, all of which are consonant in attempting to relegate 
cognitive~expectancy theory to learning~modeling theory. 
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A statement or six hypotheses will serve to summarize 
the divergent research and theory reviewed: (a) stimulus 
contiguity: if there are differences between groups, incen-
tive conditions will erase such differences, indicating that 
expectancy is not a functional part of the learning process 
in modeling; (b) contrast, focus: The partial disconfirma-
tion group (CNC) will perform more matching responses than 
group C (+S) or group Ne (-S), based on the principle of 
positive induction; (c) cognitive dissonance: NC group will 
perform more matching responses on the basis of stronger 
motivation through arousal and activation of negative drive; 
(d) sequence/orderliness; group C will learn more matching 
responses on the basis of positive self~reinforcement through 
sensory feedback; (e) response extinction: group C will 
produce more matching responses since Ne responses are 
supposed to extinguish on the basis that disconfirmed 
expectancies decrease in probability value; and (f) facilitory: 
confirmation of expectancy in group C f1stampS in'l model's 
responses, whereas ambiguity of cues in CNC group has an 
interference effect. 
The pur.pose ox this study is to determdne the effect 
that expectancy conditions of confirmation and discon£irma. 
tion have during the observational process in modeling 
17 
behavior. The "wide open stance tl taken with the use of 
several hypotheses is not a xeeble attempt to be able to 
"prove anythingtr but rather is an effort to break some new 
joint paths of study in two interesting areas of psychology, 





Subjects (Ss) were 60 primary school children, 30 from 
each o£ two public elementary schools in Pittsburg, Kansas. 
Age range was from 4.3 to 6.5 years wi th a mean age of 70 
months. 
Each experimental group contained 20 5s, 10 males and 
10 females, assigned in a random order to a predetermined 
grouping sequence of fifteen (fifteen males, :fifteen females 
for each school) thusly: C, NC, eNC; CNC, Ne, C; NC t C, eNC; 
C, NC, CNC; Ne, eNe, C. Incentive order, i.e., whether the 
incentive phase was first or the no-incentive phase was first, 
was randomly assigned to this groupillg sequence. Boys in one 
kindergarten population were selected and ordered in the 
grouping sequence by drawing numbers from a hat: the boy 
getting number one would be assigned to group C and the 
corresponding incentive phase, the second boy to group NC, and 
so forth until all boys had been ordered. The girls were 
selected and ordered the salIle way. Of the 15 boys so ordered 
and assigned at one school, boys number (1), (6), and (10) 
18 
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might be in group C; however, boy number (1) might be the 
first subject tested, boy number (6) the tenth subject tested, 
and boy number (10) the nineteenth boy tested, because boys 
and girls were tested in the same session, alternately. 
Treatment 
There were two experimental variables: expectancy and 
incentive. Expectancy was a prediction of what the S 
thou.ght would happen next in the film. Confirmation of 
expectancy occurred when SIS prediction happened in the 
film; discon£irmation of expectancy occurred when S's predic-
tion did not happen in the film. The nature of the three 
groups was determined by expectancy conditions: in group C 
at all six choice points, the film-mediated model (N) gave 
the Ugenerally expected" response (M's responses in Film A); 
in group Ne at all six choice points, the M gave ftunexpected 
responsestr (M's responses in Film B); and in group CNC at 
three alternate choice points, M gave expected responses 
and at three alternate choice points, M 9ave u.nexpected 
responses (M's responses in Film C). The three groups were 
then split equally on performance and learning measures 
(no-incentive and incentive phases), one half ox each 
group responding under incentive conditions and then under 




responses to questions about what M would do at the six 
choice points) were as follows: group C, 4.35; group Ne, 
4e 2 5; and group eNe, 4.35; this small amount of di£ference 
seems to indicate that the groups were relatively equal in 
expectation. Keeping in mind that determination of experi-
mental grouping was by the showing of a second (experimental 
film A, B, or C) and that comirmation of expectancy occurred 
when S's prediction happened in the film, the groups may be 
described in terms of percent of mean expectancies confirmed 
or disconfirmed: group CiS expectations were 72% confirmed, 
28% disconfirmed; group Ne's expectations were nearly ~ 
confirmed, nearly 1~ disconfiraed; and group CNe's expecta-
tions were 36% confiraed, 641 discanfirmed • . Thus, while the 
groups were substantially equal in what they expected M to do, 
one group was more than two-thirds confirmed in its expec-
tations, one group was more than one-third confirmed, and one 
group was not confirmedo 
Apparatus 
Ss at one school were exposed to a viewing room devoid 
of furnishings except for a projector and two chairs, and a 
trial room with a one-way mirror. In the room was a table 
with those objects viewed in the film. Conditions at the 
second school prohibited use of one-way mirrors. At this 
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school S played on the lighted side ox the room at a table 
with a table-length mirror such as used by speech therapists 
and the two observers (Os) watched S through colored plastic 
windows from inside a tent on the da.rkened s.ide of the room 
15 feet away from the S. Only one S actually walked out of 
the enclosure across the room, peered into the tent and asked 
the Os what they were doing. His responses were deleted. 
The responses of two other Ss at this school . ,ere not used 
because of a procedural change: these 55 (the rirst at this 
school) were inside the tent with the Os outside looking in. 
55 refused to respond £reely in the no-incentive phase, so 
the procedure was changed to that described above. 
In each :film described below, M enters a. room containing 
a table. On the table are the following: a teddy bear, 
about two-und-one-half feet long; a life-size milk bottle; 
toy construction hat; wooden mallet and a child's toy pound-
ing board with pegs. Also on the table in the trial room but 
not in the :film were a toy car, ner£' ball (four inch diameter 
roam ball), a rin9 stackum, and a toy telephone. The films 
are 16 mm, black and white, no sound, and 2~3 minutes in 
lengtho The :films were cued so that E could consistently 
stop at the same point to question S. M in all films was an 
adult male in his middle twenties dressed in a suit jacket and 
tie. 
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In the film descriptions below, the numerals in paren-
theses indicate the choice points at which E asked S ror 
his prediction of M's behavior (SIS expectation). 
!!.!..!. A (Training film). M picks up the bear in both 
arms and looks at it (1), then hugs it lovingly. Still 
holding the bear, he then picks up the milk bottle, posing it 
as i£ he may pretend to feed the bear (2), then he does place 
the bottle to the bear's mouth and rocks him while reeding. 
After a few seconds of this, M pla.ces the bear on his 
shoulder and raises his hand as if' to burp the bear (3). M 
pats the bear's back to burp him. M next picks up the wooden 
mallet and places it in the bear I s hand as if the bear were 
going to strike the pegs in the pounding board (4)0 M guides 
bear's hand as it pounds the pegs in the pounding board (4-5 
times). Putting the mallet down and holding the bear in one 
arm, M now picks up the toy constxuction hat and looks at it 
and then at the bear and then back to the hat, raising it up 
as if he might put it on the bear's head (5). He places the 
hat on the bear's head and smiles approvingly. M now makes 
the bear seem to knock the bat of£ its own head. M scolds the 
bear, pointin9 his finger and shaking his head in disapprovalo 
M then turns the bear on its belly and raises his hand as i£ 
to spank the bear (6). He then swats the bear's bottom three 
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times and then scolds it some more~ 
Film Ba Films B and C dif£er from Film A only in the 
response M gives at the six choice points, so only these 
differences will be described~ 
For Film B, at choice point (1), M hits the bear once, 
twice to the table and then picks i t up and shakes it. At 
(2) he drinks from the bottle himself instead of feeding the 
bear. At (3) he throws the bear over his shoulder instead of 
burping it. At (4) he takes the mallet in his own hand and 
hits the bear on the head three times. At (5) he puts his 
hand in the hat and raises it high above his head. At (6), 
hand raised to spank the bear, he scratches his head letting 
the bear drop to the floor. 
~ £0 At choice point (1) M hugs the bear as in 
Film A. At (2) he drinks the milk hiasel£ as in Film B. At 
(3) he burps the bear as in Film Ao At (4) he hits the bear 
with the mallet as in Film B. At (5) he puts hat on the 
bear's head as in Film Ao At (6) he scratches his head as in 
Film B. 
Procedure 
No-incentive, incentive seguence. S was led to the 
viewing room where a 16 mm projector was already set up with 
the training film (Film A) ready to be shown. S was told by E: 
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nWe're going to watch a film about a man and a teddy bear. 
It' $ called f Mike and the Bear. t Are you ready?'1 The £i 1m 
was shown wi thout comment by E. E rewound the f'ilm and loaded 
the appropriate experimental film for showing (Film A for 
group C, Film B for group Ne, and Film C for group CNC). E: 
flNow we will watch the film again, only this time I will stop 
the :film and ask you some questions about what yon think is 
going to happen next. Be ready to answer when I stop. Are 
you ready?" At the cued points, E stopped the f'ilm and asked 
S: UWhat do you think the man will do next,11 or "What will 
he do with the bear (or mallet, or hat)?U and recorded S's 
answer without comment. Af'ter the film has been shown, E 
asked S to wait in a room with a one-way mirror (or at the 
table with the long mirror for the second school), the room 
already having in it the objects seen in the film and the 
other toys not associated with M's responses. "Please wai t 
here for a few minutes until I come back to get you. I'm going 
to get you some more toys to play with. You may play wi th 
anything you want. tJ As E closed the door, or le:ft the room, 
E began timing the no-incentive phase (S minutes) while the 
two Os recorded all ox SIS responses on the check :form in 
terms of predetermined responses categories (See Appendix B). 
After the trial period, E reentered the trial room and said, 
"Now, (calls by name), do you remember what Mike did 
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in the film? I want you to try to do as many things as you 
can that you saw Mike do in the film. For everything that 
you do that Mike did I'll give you a sticker picture, like 
this. And if you get the pictures all in a little circle, 
I'll give you a toy animal (or toy baseball player) to keep. 
Okay t show me what Mike did. II S was given a sticker picture 
immediately following each response that matched M in either 
film viewed--responses that corresponded to the choice points, 
such as feeding the bear with the milk bottle. Verbal rein-
forcement ("Right" or f1Good1.) was given for matching component 
responses, su.ch as picking up the milk bottle. If S stopped 
after performing a response and receiving reward, E said, 
tfShow me something else Mike did, ff and so on until S volun-
teered he could remember no more. 
The procedure for the incentive t no"incentive sequence 
was the reverse of no-incentive, incentive sequence. 
Response measure. The response measure for both the 
incentive and no-incentive phases was the type and frequency 
or responses matching the model in Film A (training film)o 
The observers recorded all of SiS responses on the Check Form 
ror E Observer (Appendix B). Since they had not seen the 
fi Ims and did not know the purpose of the experiment t the Os 
could not know which responses were matching responses. Four 
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untrained female observers recorded responses: two scored 
the same children in anyone session, the other two taking 
the next session. The four scored £ive children independently 
in one session for an estimate of interscorer reliability and 
on the major choice point responses (the number of different 
imitative responses produced) agreed 80%. 
Chapter III 
Results 
Table 2 summarizes the analysis or variance of matching 
responses to the training film under incentive and expectancy 
conditions". The training or first film in the two~f'ilm 
sequence was viewed by all 5s. The findings show that the 
expectancy condition (Film A, B, or C) had no erfect on 
matching model r e sponses in the training film, either under 
incentive or no-incentive conditions (p > .10). Expectancy 
and incentive did not interact (p) ~05). The incentive 
condition had a signi£icant effect on the number of matching 
responses produced (p <.05). The Summary Table (Table 3) 
Ior the training film shows this effect to be in the expected 
positivQ direction, that is, that more responses were pro-
duced under incentive than under no~incentive conditions. 
Table 3 shows that group C and eNC provided the differences 
between incentive and no.-incentive conditions, while for 
group NC the effect of incentive was in a slightly negative 
direction, that is, group NC was the only group in which more 
responses were produced under no.incentiva than under incen~ 




Since for half the S5 the incentive phase of incentivel 
no~incentive was first, and for half the incentive phase was 
second, the e££ects of varying the sequence should be shown. 
Table 4 is a summary table of incentive order. It may be 
noted that when incentive was second, there were more 
matching responses (262) than when incentive was .first (249), 
following the expected increase in a nO,-incentive, incentive 
sequence (226 to 262) similar to Bandur a (1965a). However, 
when incentive was first, that is, in the incentive, no-
incentive sequence, there was a decrease in matching responses 
(249 to 181), the absolute difference in this sequence between 
incentive and no~incentive being more than twice the difference 
in the Bandurian sequence (no-incentive, incentive)o- Overall, 
those who had incentive first started at a higber plane and 
tailed o££ in the mo-incentive phase, while those who had the 
no~incentive phase first started at a correspondingly lower 
plane and increased slightly in the incentive phase, indi~ 
eating that a major reason ror the signiricance of incentive 
as shown by the analysis of variance may be the suppression 
OI response on a no-incentive phase immediately following an 
incentive phase (See Figure 1). 
Whereas Table 2 sUJBII.arizes an analysis of variance of 




overlapping of responses between films (See Appendix B). The 
three films do differ in major response categories (Table 6), 
such as £eeding the bear milk (Film A) v. drinking from the 
bottle himseli (Film B), but are similar in the v.arious 
component responses, such as picking up the bear and the milk 
bottle (both Films A and B). It is not practical to divide 
the single response measure into categories of those 
matching the first film and those matching the second film 
since there is no clear differentiat.ion, even in groups NC 
and eNC. Therefore, for purposes of interpreting data, 
responses matching the training film (Table ~will be used. 
TABLE 5 
Analysis of Variance: Matching Responses to 
Experimental Film (Second Fi~) 
Source d:f MS F 
I 
I 
Between Ss S9 
Expectancy (A) 2 95.025 7.769** 
Ss within groups 57 12.232 
Within Ss 60 
, 
Incentive (B) 1 45.633 4.138 * 
A XB 2 
,-
20.909 1.896 
B X 5s wi thin groups 57 11.027 1.896 





Since there were no significant dif'ferences due to the 
expectancy treatment, all or the six proposed hypotheses 
must be rejected. One cannot even accept hypothesis (a), 
which states that nit' there are differences between groups, 
incentive conditions will erase such di:fferences, indicating 
that expectation is not a functional part of' the learning 
process in modeling," since this hypothesis is prefaced on 
group differences. The results indirectly support the last 
part of the hypothesis, and hence, Bandura's stimulus 
contiguity theory. That is, the learning or the model's 
responses in the zirst fila did not depend on confirmation or 
disconfirmation of expectancy through a second film. Bandura 
might argue that a certain amount of learning took place 
during the training (:first) £ilm so that the expectancy 
condi tion (second film) would not have an effect so much on 
observational learning as on subsequent performance Q 
However, whether expectation has to do wi th learning 
or performance depends on the learning/perf"ormance distinc~ 
tion used. Each experimenter may operationalize his own 
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distinction. For example, Bandura (196Sa) has assumed a 
relatively accurate index ox learning to be perIormance under 
positive incentive conditions. Assumdng response measures are 
accurate, application o:f Baadura's index to this study shows 
that group NC (Table 3) per:formed :fewer responses under the 
incentive than under the no-incentive condition and thus 
apparently did not learn. This is of course preposterous and 
only reminds us that in the measure or learning under 
incentive (as opposed to the measure of per£ormance under 
no-incentive), much can have intervened between the initial 
observational learning and the learning per:formance, for 
instance, other observational learning. 
It is obvious that zuture research attempting to relate 
expectancy to imitative learning must insure that the 
expectancy condition and the observational learning condition 
occur in the same situation, that is, simultaneously (assuming 
these ~ separate constructs). 
Besides the lack of contemporaneity ox the expectancy 
variable and observational learning during the xirst film, 
another criticism that may account for the lack of effect of 
the expectancy condition is that expectancy apparently was 
not a Uf'elt" condition, was not strongly held. For instance, 
it seems unlikely that a subject in the NC group experienced 
dissonance at a motivating level, though there is perhaps 
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slight indication or inhibition of responses under incentive 
condi tions when compared with groups C and CNC. Or it might 
be that Ss in group NC felt punished by the expeximental 
treatment (Film B) and in an ef:fort to "make up" with the 
adult authority (E), responded more during the uncertainty 
o:f the no~incentive phase, so that when the incentive phase 
came second (and more certainty or security), fewer responses 
resulted. 
As defined by the use ox a second film in which what S 
expected at six choice points was confirmed (group C), 
disconfirmed (group He), or alternately confirmed and discon .. 
firmed (group eNC) , expectancy was largely perceptual instead 
of ":felt." It was thought that defining expectancy this way 
would give more weight to findings in regard to adding to or 
revising Bandura' s stim1 1us/contigui ty theory, which states 
that perceptual and symbolic responses acquired during 
observational learning cue or elicit overt responses which 
match those modeled. 
Thus, besides measuring expectancy during the initial 
observational process, a second recommendation :for :future 
research would be to define the expectancy condition such 
that the subject :feels strong dissonance at its disconfirma-
tion. It may be that the extent to which expectancy is 
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important during modeling is a function of the consequences 
that accrue around its confirmation or discon£irmation. 
Contrast disconfirmation of expectancy in this experiment and 
its effect on imitative behavior with other possible, more 
motivatianally-tinted disconfirmations. For instance, 
consider a subject who sees a model do things in a film, 
predicts on this basis, finds all predictions were wrong, and 
then is asked to imitate the model; contrast this with a 
subject who is promised $20.00 to view a model in a film, 
told he cannot be paid after all, and then is asked to imitate 
the model. The question becomes: Does expectancy playa 
part in learning or mot:ivation (incentive)? Or, are the two 
recommendations (i.e., to measure expectancy during observa-
tional learning and to make expectancy a "feltH condition) 
compatible? 
Related to the validity or the expectancy condition are 
the believability of the film as related to age level and 
the length ox time between rilms. The mean age of children 
in this study was 70 months as compared to the mean age of 
51 months in Bandura's model-consequences study (1965a). 
The amount of imitativeness at various age levels was not ox 
interest in this experiment and it was assumed that the films 
are believable (imitative) :for this age group (4 to 6 years). 
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The expectancy treatment (second film) immediately followed 
the training film. A longer time interval between films 
might have been conducive to greater matching of responses 
modeled in the second film but would also have removed the 
con£irmation or disconfirmation of expectancy even farther 
from the observational process. 
It was noted in the Results section in reporting analysis 
of variance of matching responses to the second film that 
group C might be expected to produce more matching responses 
due to practice effects since those S5 saw the same film 
twice. However, in the Summary Table of matching responses 
to the first fiLm (Table 3), this difference is not evident: 
group eNC without practice performed more matching responses 
under incentive conditions and group NC more under no-incen-
tive conditions, though neither were significantly different. 
This seems to indicate that practice did not have a signifi-
cant effect, but rather that the reasons for the contrived 
differences in matching responses on the second film (Table 
5) are lack of differentiation between f'irst and second film 
responses, especially between the various component responses, 
and that 5s simply matched those responses in the training 
(first) film and not in the experimental (second) film. 
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This study seemed to have more relevance ror incentive 
condition (incentive v. no-incentive) and possibly incentive 
order (first v. second) than for expectancy. Incentive order 
merits inclusion in further i ncentive v. no-incentive treat-
ments of imitation, especially as incentive purports to 
di£fereatiate learning and performance. As indicated in the 
Results section, the main reason ror the signiricance of the 
incentive condition in this study was not so much the 
increase of responses arter a no-incentive phase but the 
decrease of responses after an incentive phase. The use of 
an incentive, no-incentive sequence and its consequent 
suppression of response in the second phase does not invali-
date the Bandurian no-incentive, incentive sequence, but one 
wonders whether or not a reversed incentive sequ,ence in 
Bandura's model--consequences experiment (1965a) would have 
"wiped outn reward/punishment differences. Incentive order 
seems to involve a different kind of expectancy~-expectancy 
of reward. There is little likelihood S would expect reward 
in a no-incentive following an incentive phase because in 
this procedure E, the giver of reward, was absent in the no-
incentive phase. Except :for group NC, this incentive, 
no-incentive sequence seems to point to a common sUbject Atti-
tude of HI've pleased E, got my rewards, now I can do what I 
want." 
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There are several procedural questions. (a) Was the 
training film necessary? Since its purpose was to provide 
a common background for the 5s, to build relatively same 
expectancies, the training film could also have included the 
confirmation or disconrirmation or the second film, if it 
were carefully made. This would have the advantage of 
measuring expectancy during the initial observational process. 
(b) Did the "cbaracter ll of the films have a special effect? 
One doubts that receipt o:f reward was the only reason for 
incentive, no-incentive differences, since group NC showed very 
small differences while groups C and CNC were responsible for 
the significant difference (p < .05). The expectancy 
condition for NC (total disconfirmation) did not interact with 
incentive, so one speculates as to what did. It was perhaps 
the character of the films: group CIS film (A) shows M as 
loving and helpful; group Nels film (B) shows M as selfish 
and hostile; and group CNe's film (C) shows M as both loving 
and hostile o The character of the films may have affected 
certain attentional aspects of observational learning or 
elicited emotional responses which could affect performance. 
Epstein (1962) has theorized that the use of an aggressive M 
in film may result in S identifying with the aggressor as a 
defense mechanism to avoid anxiety. (c) One wonders about 
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the use o£ a film projector with its stoppages (at the choice 
points to ask S his expectation) as opposed to the rather 
incidental viewing of a television screen in Bandura's exper-
iment (l965a). Are such stoppages and question-asking 
facilitative or inhibitory to the process of expectancy? 
(d) Do several disconfirmed expectancies have a building effect 
similar to the Asch conformity situation (1952)? Unlike the 
conformer in the Asch experiment, the conformer distraught at 
having expectation discon£irmed has no majority opinion in 
which to take refuge (only the opposites of what he expects). 
(e) Is expectancy as a cognitive process to be measured in 
terms of total or general responses. such as associated with 
each choice point (See Table 6), or numerous component respon-
ses? Since E rewarded 5 with sticker pictures only for the 
major responses, was the number of responses in the incentive 
trials artiricially restricted, that is, not equally likely to 
occur as those in the no.incentive phase? Because of the 
nature or giving reward and because of individual differences, 
the incentive phase tended to be less than the 5~minute 
no-incentive phase length o 
Determining the effect of confirmation and disconfirma-
tion of expectancy during the observational process of 
imitative learning may only be, like so many measurement 
problems in psychology, a procedural problem. 
Chapter V 
Summary 
The purpose or this study was to determine the e££ects 
of confirmation and disconfirmation or expectancy during 
modeling behavior, or imitative learning. Very little research 
has been done relating the learning concept of modeling to 
the cognitive concept of expectancy~ so several hypotheses 
were made based on rinding differences between the three 
groups, defined by conditions o£ expectancy confirmation: 
group C, l()()% cOnIirmed; group CNC, 50)5 conf'irmed; and group 
NC, ~ confirmed. All Ss (60 primary school children) were 
exposed to a training film in which an adult male performed 
a novel repertoire or responses, to an experimental fi~ 
which confirmed or disconfirmed SiS verbal expectancies and 
then were observed under inoentive and no~incentive conditions. 
Analysis of variance of the response measure (S's 
responses matching MiS responses in the training film) shQwed 
that the expectancy treatment was not signiricant, but the 
incentive treatment was signif'icant at the .01 level Q 
Results were interpreted to mean that the siDple, per-
ceptual derinition of confirmation of expectancy--S seeing 
what be had said M would do next in the £ilm--was not found 
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to be important for its effect on modeling behavior. It was 
thus hypothesized that expectancy as a ".tel ttl motivational 
condition (e.g., expectancy has an emotional effect, such as 
expecting $20.00 and not getting it) and measured during 
actual observational learning, that is, during the training 
film, would have a greater exxect on learning M's responses 
than merely expecting something to occur in a film. 
The signixicance of the incentive treatment was in the 
expected positive direction, that, more matching responses 
were performed under incentive than under no-incentive. 
Incentive order (Incentive, No~incentive Vo No-incentive, 
Incentive) may be an important design £law in other published 
experiments in which the primary differentiation between 
performance and learning is positive incentive conditions. 
Appendix 
Appendix A 
SUBJECT ANSWER FORM FOR USE BY EXPERIMENTER 
Subject ________________ _ 







_ bugs bear 
hits bear 
feeds bear milk 
drinks from bottle himself 
_ burps bear 
throws bear over shoulder 
-- nits pegs in pounding board 
hits bear with mallet 
-------~-----
- puts hat on bear's head 
-- puts hat on own head 
____ holds hat on hand up high 
spanks the bear 




Subject Group ____ CHECK FORM FOR E CBSERVER Observer Name 
10 BEAR 2. 10 MIIK BOTTLE 2:. I.PEGBOARD/MALLET 2. 10 HAT 2. 
_ picks up bear 
_ hugs bear 
--picks up milk bottle 
reeds bear with bottle 
--picks up mallet 
~uts mallet in 
----Oear's paw and 
--picks up hat 
_ puts hat on 
--oear's head 
hits bear 
--pu.ts bear on 
shoulder 
1. 
drinks £rom bottle 
himself 
CAR 
-p'a t s bear's back_ --pushes car around 
(burps bear) 
scolds bear --picks up car 
--(shakes finger --
and head at bear) 






crashes car into 
- another toy 
lets bear push car 
1. NERF BALL 
throws ball up and 
- catches 





........,puts hat on 
own head 
__ hi~s bear's head __ --puts hat on _ 
W1 th mallet hand and raises 
1. RING STACKING 2. 




hat off its 
own head 
-- peg 
__ stacks rings up 
1. TELEPHONE 2 • 
__________ --pretends to call 
1. RANDOM 2. 
stands around not --pretends to 
--playing w/toys let bear talk--
2. 
__ walks around 
not playing w/toYS-
~------ ..... -----~--- --. ---------...-.~--
1. OTHER 2. 
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